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A VIEW FROM INSIDE THE ROPES: A
PROSECUTOR'S VIEWPOINT ON DISCLOSING
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE
FredKlein*
The qualities of a good prosecutor are as elusive and as impossible to
define as those which mark a gentleman. And those who need to be
told would not understand it anyway. A sensitiveness to fair play and
sportsmanship is perhaps the best protection against the abuse of
power, and the citizen's safety lies in the prosecutor who tempers zeal
with human kindness, who seeks truth and not victims, who serves the
law and not factional purposes, and who approaches his task with
humility.'
In late August 2009, after thirty years as a local and state
prosecutor, I began a new position as a Visiting Assistant Professor at
the Hofstra University School of Law. Within three weeks of my first
class, I received a call from Professor Roy D. Simon, the Howard
Lichtenstein Distinguished Professor of Legal Ethics at Hofstra, inviting
me to attend the conference he had organized, "Power, Politics & Public
Service: The Legal Ethics of Lawyers in Government," and to supervise
a "breakout session" with other conference participants. When I saw the
distinguished panel Professor Simon had assembled for the conference, I
replied by thanking him for the opportunity but suggested that I had
nothing to contribute compared to the other speakers. Professor Simon
responded that I possessed something unique that would be a useful
addition to the program: a perspective based on a three-decade career of
* Fred Klein was an Assistant District Attorney in Nassau County, New York, for twentyseven years where he was in charge of the Major Offense Bureau for twelve of those years. He was
also an Assistant Attorney General in the New York State Attorney General's Office for three years
where he investigated and prosecuted organized crime and Medicaid fraud cases. He would like to
thank Hofstra Law School for giving him the opportunity to learn from the faculty and students, and
the Hofstra Law Review for correcting, improving, and publishing this essay.
1. Robert H. Jackson, U.S. Attorney Gen., The Federal Prosecutor, Address at the Second
Annual Conference of U.S. Attorneys (Apr. 1, 1940), in 31 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
3,6(1940).
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public service as a prosecutor. I agreed to provide a career prosecutor's
viewpoint on fairness in general and disclosure obligations in particular.
As a resident of Nassau County and a member of the local legal
community, I am proud to be associated with Hofstra, which has
developed a well-earned reputation for expertise, scholarship, and
leadership in the field of legal ethics through the work of Professor
Simon, as well as Professor Monroe Freedman and the other
extraordinary faculty members. This seventh in a series of legal ethics
conferences held at Hofstra-focusing on the ethical responsibilities of
government attorneys-could not be more timely or important.
The issue most frequently associated with prosecutorial ethics (or
lack thereof), and usually the source of claims of prosecutorial
misconduct, is the duty to disclose favorable evidence to the defense in a
criminal case, otherwise known as Brady material. 3 To summarize the
general law in this area, the prosecutor is constitutionally required to
notify the defense of information that is helpful to the defendant and
which may have some impact on the outcome of the criminal case. 4
Basically, prosecutors are obligated to review their own work (and that
of the people working with them) and call the other side's attention to
anything in that work which could help them.5 The failure to disclose
exculpatory information has been attributed to a significant number of
wrongful convictions. 6

2. In this conference dealing with the ethics of government attorneys, it is interesting to note
that none of the presenters were active prosecutors. See Hofstra Univ. Sch. of Law, Power, Politics
& Public Service: The Legal Ethics of Lawyers in Government (Oct. 18-20, 2009),
http://law.hofstra.edu/pdf/NewsAndEvents/Conferences/EthicsConference/ethicsbrochure.pdf.
While several of the speakers were former prosecutors and one was campaigning for District
Attorney, none were presently burdened with the pressures of that position. See id. Were present
District Attorneys invited but declined to attend? Surely, one District Attorney in the metropolitan
New York area was available. Compare a conference held at Cardozo Law School a week later
entitled "New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations: What Really Works?"
where several current prosecutors appeared as presenters and panelists. See Press Release, Benjamin
N. Cardozo Sch. of Law, Yeshiva Univ., Conference: New Perspectives on Brady and Other
Disclosure
Obligations:
What
Really
Works
2-4
http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/Nov-2009_Symposium.pdf.

(Nov.

15-16,

2009),

3. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 85-87 (1963).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 87-88.
6. See TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N, GOV'T
PRACTICES SUBCOMM., SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT AND FINAL PROPOSALS 19 (2009), in N.Y. STATE
BAR Ass'N, FINAL REPORT OF NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION'S TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS (2009), available at http://www.nysba.org/Content/ContentFolders/TaskForceon

WrongfulConvictions/FinalWrongfulConvictionsReport.pdf;
Peter A. Joy, The Relationship
Between ProsecutorialMisconduct and Wrongful Convictions: Shaping Remedies For a Broken
System, 2006 Wis. L. REv. 399, 403.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol38/iss3/4

2

Klein: A View from inside the Ropes: A Prosecutor's Viewpoint on Disclos

2010]

DISCLOSING EXCULPA TORYEVIDENCE

869

This obligation has always reminded me of a sports analogy.' As
distinct from baseball, football, basketball or hockey, the golfer has a
unique duty to penalize himself for an infraction which has not been
detected by the competition, the judges, or even the viewing public.
Could you imagine, for instance, a batter in baseball calling a strike on
himself when the umpire thought the pitch was a ball? Or a quarterback
calling "offsides" on his team when nobody else had noticed? Unlike
other sports, the actions of the golfer are frequently seen by only the
golfer himself, yet he has the responsibility to self impose a penalty for a
rules infraction.
Likewise, the information in a prosecutor's file is normally known
only to the prosecution team and not observable by the defense, the
court, or the public. 9 Yet the criminal justice system relies on the
government lawyer to find the information, recognize its significance to
the defense and self impose a "penalty" by disclosing it to the

7. I am not the first to use sports in the discussion of prosecutor's ethics. See David L.
Botsford & Stanley G. Schneider, The "Law Game ": Why ProsecutorsShould Be Prevented From
a Rematch; Double Jeopardy Concerns Stemming From ProsecutorialMisconduct, 45 S. TEX. L.
REV. 729, 730 (2006) ("The teams line up, the accused faces the prosecutors, the gavel cracks, and
the game begins."); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest
For Truth? A ProgressReport, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 16 (1990) (stating that the adversary system
has commonly been compared to "a fight" or "a boxing match"); Kenneth Bresler, "I Never Lost a
Trial": When ProsecutorsKeep Score of Criminal Convictions, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 537, 54146 (1996) (opining that "prosecutorial score-keeping" is "absurd," "egotistical," and
"unprofessional"); Bennett L. Gershman, Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games ProsecutorsPlay,
57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531, 538 (2007) ("Discussion of U.S. litigation frequently employs the
metaphors of sports and games."). Cf Susan Hayes Stephan, Blowing the Whistle on Justice as
Sport: 100 Years of Playing a Non-Zero Sum Game, 30 HAMLINE L. REV. 587, 588-89 (2007)
(disputing the "sporting theory of justice" by arguing that litigation is not a zero-sum game). I have
not found, however, the previous use of golf as an analogy to a prosecutor's ethics.
8.
[G]olf is played, for the most part, without the supervision of a referee or umpire. The
game relies on the integrity of the individual to show consideration for other players and
to abide by the Rules. All players should conduct themselves in a disciplined manner,
demonstrating courtesy and sportsmanship at all times, irrespective of how competitive
they may be. This is the spirit of the game of golf.
U.S. Golf Ass'n, Golf Etiquette 101, http://www.usga.org/etiquette/tips/Golf-Etiquette-101/ (last
visited Aug. 21, 2010). In 1925, the legendary golfer Bobby Jones (who also later became an
attorney), lost the U.S. Open golf tournament by one stroke after penalizing himself for an
inadvertent infraction that no one but himself had observed. See MARK FROST, THE GRAND SLAM:
BOBBY JONES, AMERICA, AND THE STORY OF GOLF 227-30 (2004); see also STEVEN PRESSFIELD,
THE LEGEND OF BAGGER VANCE: GOLF AND THE GAME OF LIFE 202-06 (1995) (describing the

moment when Rannulph Junah calls a one-stroke penalty on himself at a critical point in his match
against Walter Hagen and Bobby Jones, despite the fact that only he and his young caddy saw the
infraction).
9. See Rodney Uphoff, Convicting the Innocent: Aberration or Systemic Problem?, 2006
WIS. L. REV. 739, 835 ("[D]efendants in criminal cases are afforded less access to information than
civil defendants.").
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"competition" with the possibility that it may adversely affect the
likelihood of a conviction. o If the golfer's failure to disclose an
infraction is fortuitously uncovered, it can result in the sanction of
disqualification from the match." If the prosecutor's failure to disclose
exculpatory information is somehow uncovered, it can lead to the
reversal of a conviction and personal penalties being separately imposed
on the prosecutor.12
Of course, this simplistic analogy of a prosecutor to a golfer is not
completely accurate. The golfer's immediate objective is to win the
match and obtain the accompanying financial rewards and national
ranking, thereby giving him a strong motive not to penalize himself. The
prosecutor's objective, on the other hand, is not that easy to define. The
prosecutor's goal is not to "win" the case by obtaining a conviction. It is
the prosecutor's responsibility to be a "minister of justice," whatever
that is taken to mean, and while in doing so the prosecutor "may strike
hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones."' 3 Basically, as the
Supreme Court has recognized, the prosecutor should seek the truth in
every investigation no matter where that leads. 14 In the words of a
former Attorney General of the United States and Justice of the Supreme
Court, "[a]lthough the government technically loses its case [with an
acquittal], it has really won if justice has been done."15 Therefore, there
is a stronger motive for a golfer to suppress an infraction than for a
prosecutor to suppress exculpatory information. While unknown
violations of the rules will not adversely affect the golfer's goal of
winning, when the prosecutor gets away with rules violations, innocent
people may suffer, thereby defeating the pursuit of justice.
Yet from a review of recently published decisions of various courts
or even by just reading the national or local news, it is apparent that
there is a large distinction between the integrity of the prosecutor and the
professional golfer. Through the recent expansion in the use of DNA
10. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87-88.
11. See U.S. Golf Ass'n, supra note 8.
12. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87-88; see also Malia N. Brink, A Pendulum Swung Too Far: Why
the Supreme Court Must Place Limits on ProsecutorialImmunity, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 1, 3-8
(2009) (explaining the case law surrounding civil liability and immunity for prosecutorial
misconduct).
13. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
14. See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 696 (2004) ("We have several times underscored 'the
special role played by the American prosecutor in the search for truth in criminal trials."); see also
Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor'sDuty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309, 337 (2001)
("Although not articulated in judicial decisions, a prosecutor's duty to truth embraces a duty to
make an independent evaluation of the credibility of his witnesses, the reliability of forensic
evidence, and the truth of the defendant's guilt.").
15. Jackson, supra note 1, at 4.
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technology, the hard work of defense attorneys and judges, and even
review of previous convictions by successor prosecutors, we have
frequently been exposed to government lawyers who have failed to
comply with their legal and ethical responsibility to penalize themselves
by providing information to the other side. 16 Although the vast majority
of prosecutors undoubtedly perform their work with dedication and
adherence to the rules, the conduct of a small minority has served to
tarnish the profession at least in the eyes of some. 17 While this can
occasionally be "corrected" before it results in unwarranted
incarceration, too many times the discovery leads to the exoneration of
innocent persons after they have served lengthy prison sentences.
Some scholars have attributed these miscarriages of justice to
inexperienced and overworked prosecutors or those who need to keep
conviction rates high for re-election purposes. 9 While these are
certainly correct observations in some cases, recent high profile cases
have involved a District Attorney himself and highly experienced federal
prosecutors who are not directly subject to the electorate as well as trial
level prosecutors who are insulated from politics. 2 0 A review of these
cases highlights the difficulties in preventing this form of prosecutorial
misconduct.
In the "Duke Lacrosse case," District Attorney Michael Nifong,
from 2006-2007, led the prosecution of several white college students
for the alleged rape of an African American woman who was hired to
perform a sexually suggestive dance at a party attended by members of
the college lacrosse team.21 At the time, Nifong was involved in a
campaign to be elected District Attorney and was relying on the support
of the African American community to prevail. 22 In addition to the
16. See Joy, supranote 6, at 403.
17. Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 355, 374 (2001) (stating that "generally, prosecutors routinely validate and perpetuate [the]
sorry state of affairs" in the criminal justice system).
18. See Joy, supranote 6, at 403.
19. See, e.g., Joy, supra note 6, at 405 ("At the state level, nearly all chief prosecutors are
elected, thus directly accountable to the public."); Carrie Johnson, Shortfalls Unraveled Stevens's
Conviction, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 2009, at Al (quoting Gerald E. McDowell, who stated that
supervisors generally do not "nitpick" their subordinates "because there is not enough time, given
crushing case loads").
20. See infra notes 21-22, 31, 46-47 and accompanying text.
21. See Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarment of
Mike Nifong: The Critical Importance of Full Open-File Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. REv. 257,
285-306 (2008) [hereinafter Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence] (describing the Duke Lacrosse case);
Robert P. Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case, Innocence, and False Identifications:A Fundamental
Failure to "Do Justice," 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 1337, 1341-47 (2007) [hereinafter Mosteller, The
Duke Lacrosse Case] (describing the Duke Lacrosse case).
22. See Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case,supra note 21, at 1354-57.
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inherent weakness of a sex crimes case involving an "escort" with a
criminal record who has already given multiple inconsistent statements
about what happened, Nifong was confronted with DNA results from
items relating to the complainant which not only virtually excluded
every male at the party but which pointed to other males as DNA
contributors.2 3 Rather than informing the defense of this information
which any rational attorney would recognize as helpful to those charged,
he initially instructed the lab director to omit it from the report, falsely
informed the court that all DNA information had been disclosed, and
subsequently buried the raw exculpatory data in 1844 pages of material
that was turned over to the defense.24 Whether this was an attempt on his
part to help his election chances or merely sharp advocacy intended to
prevent or delay disclosure of information that would devastate the
prosecution's case, it resulted in his disbarment, criminal conviction,
serving a day in jail, and potential civil liability. 25
The Duke Lacrosse case has been rightfully described as a
"disaster" and "a fiasco" that "will likely not be seen again soon." 26 Yet,
in the 2008 prosecution of Ted Stevens for failing to list information on
required financial disclosure forms, the U.S. Department of Justice was
also discovered to have repeatedly failed to meet its required disclosure
requirements, leading the Attorney General himself to request that the
ultimate conviction be vacated.27 The catalyst for the dismissal was
discovery after the verdict, but before sentence, of notes of prosecutors'
interview with the main witness which had not previously been
disclosed to the defense. 2 8 These notes were inconsistent with the
witness' trial testimony that directly inculpated the defendant.29
23. Id. at 1347 & n.33, 1359.
24. Id. at 1359, 1361-62.
25. Mosteller,Exculpatory Evidence, supra note 21, at 302.
26. Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case, supra note 21, at 1337-38.
27. See Johnson, supra note 19, at Al (describing the Stevens investigation); Neil A. Lewis,
Tables Turned on Prosecution in Stevens Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2009, at Al (describing the
Stevens investigation); Neil A. Lewis & David Johnston, Dismayed Lawyers Lay Out Reasons for
Collapse of the Stevens Conviction, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2009, at A20 (describing the Stevens
investigation and the reasons for its failure); Joe Palazzolo & Mike Scarcella, Losing Integrity: How
Justice Fumbled its Case Against Ted Stevens, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 6, 2009, at I (setting forth a
timeline of the events in the Stevens investigation); Steven R. Peikin & Jordan T. Razza, Failed
Stevens Prosecution Reveals Need for New DOJ Policy, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 23, 2009, at 4 (describing
the Stevens investigation).
28. See Palazzolo & Scarcella, supra note 27, at 6.
29. The witness had testified at the trial that he did not send a bill to the Senator for work
done on his house, which had been requested by the Senator, because a third party acting for the
Senator told him the Senator really did not want to receive a bill. See Lewis, supra note 27. The
notes of the prosecutors indicated, however, that prior to the trial the witness denied having any
knowledge of such a conversation. Id.
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This blatant misconduct would have been sufficiently disgraceful
based on the fact that Stevens was a sitting U.S. Senator, the longest
serving Republican in the history of the Senate.30 One would think that
the prosecution would attempt to be scrupulously fair in such a high
publicity case. It was even more egregious, however, because the
prosecution was led by the veteran Deputy Chief of the Justice
Department's Public Integrity Unit, the group of lawyers responsible for
prosecuting public officials for misconduct.3 1 After concluding that, "In
nearly 25 years on the bench, I've never seen anything approaching the
mishandling and misconduct that I've seen in this case," the federal
judge who dismissed the case appointed a special prosecutor to
investigate the possibility of bringing criminal charges against members
of the prosecution team for their own misconduct.32
Finally, there was the comparatively routine prosecution in United
States v. Jones,3 3 which was the subject of the conference presentation
of Hon. Mark L. Wolf, Chief Judge in the Federal District Court in
Massachusetts. 34 Mr. Darwin Jones was being prosecuted by the U.S.
Attorney's Office for possessing a handgun.3 5 It was alleged by the
arresting officer during the suppression hearing that, after he recognized
the defendant from previous encounters and the defendant
uncharacteristically tried to avoid him, he had a reasonable suspicion to
pursue him, which ultimately led to his apprehension and seizure of the
gun.3 6 Unfortunately for the Assistant U.S. Attorney, however, her notes
from three previous interviews she conducted with the officer surfaced
during an in camera review by Judge Wolf, not having been disclosed to
the defense earlier, which showed that he had told the prosecutor on
each occasion that he did not recognize the defendant until after the
apprehension.37

Significantly, the circumstantial evidence surrounding these
previous interviews makes it difficult to credit the prosecutor's
subsequent assertion that the failure to disclose the notes was
inadvertent. On April 7, 2008, the prosecutor's notes reflect that the

30. Id.
31. Johnson, supranote 19.
32. Stevens Off the Hook, But Not Prosecutors, CBSNEWS.COM (Apr. 7, 2009),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/04/07/politics/main4924428.shtml.
33. See United States v. Jones, 620 F. Supp. 2d 163, 164-68 (D. Mass. 2009) (stating the facts
of the case and procedural history); see also Brink, supra note 12, at 22-24 (discussing facts of the
Jones case).
34. See Hofstra Univ. Sch. of Law, supra note 2.
35. Jones, 620 F. Supp. 2d at 164.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 164-65.
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officer told her twice that he did not recognize the defendant.38 Yet in a
written court filing eight days later, the prosecutor asserted that the
officer did recognize the defendant.39 Judge Wolf concluded that the
prosecutor had not "provided any comprehensible, let alone credible,
explanation for these blatant inconsistencies."40
Additionally, on October 6, 2008, the prosecutor was again told by
the officer that he did not recognize the defendant.4 1 Yet four days later,
when she disclosed some exculpatory material to the defense, she made
no reference of these additional inconsistent statements. 42 Finally, on
October 24, 2008, the officer again told the prosecutor that he did not
recognize the defendant and this statement was also not disclosed to the
defendant, but four days later the prosecutor allowed the officer to testify
under oath that he did recognize the defendant.4 3 The next day, when the
judge ordered the prosecutor to review her notes and disclose any
exculpatory information, including impeachment material, the
prosecutor replied that she had done so and there was nothing to
disclose.4 4 After providing her notes to the judge who found the glaring
discrepancies, the prosecutor then conceded that her review (and that of
her supervisor) "was too quick and cursory." 4 5
From this brief description, a thoughtful reader might conclude that
this prosecutor had little prior experience, particularly in the courtroom.
The facts, however, are otherwise. She had been a state prosecutor who,
46
for at least five years, had prosecuted child abuse and homicide cases.
While an Assistant U.S. Attorney, she had been assigned to the Major
Crimes Unit before being promoted to the Organized Crime Unit.4 7
Despite this impressive experience, her training supplied by the U.S.
Attorney's Office and the Department of Justice, and the judge's specific
direction for her to review her notes for exculpatory impeachment
material the day after the officer testified, Judge Wolf concluded that she
"did not understand her discovery obligations." 4 8 He declined to institute
criminal contempt proceedings against the prosecutor for violating his

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 166.
Id.
Id. at 181.
Id. at 166-67.
Id. at 181.
Id. at 167.
Id. at 181-82.
Id. at 182.
Id. at 182-83.
Id. at 183.
Id. at 181.
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orders. 4 9 As a result of this case and many others in his district that
Judge Wolf considers "a dismal history of intentional and inadvertent
violations" of disclosure rules, he decided to organize training sessions
on criminal discovery given by federal judges and invited government
attorneys to attend.50 He has not decided whether to order federal
prosecutors to attend.
I respectfully suggest that these three recent prosecutorial disasters
demonstrate that there is no simple explanation for why exculpatory
material is withheld or how to prevent it. In the Duke Lacrosse case you
have the District Attorney himself engaging in the flagrant suppression
of obviously exculpatory evidence in a case closely watched by the
public and defended by several well-funded and highly competent
attorneys.52 One could argue that the pressures of a contested election
led to the result but it is hard to believe that those pressures could lead to
such stupidity, particularly in a state with a strong full open-file
discovery rule which made locating the information inevitable.53 You
cannot explain the Stevens case on electoral politics, however. The
Department of Justice was responsible for that dismissal, not prosecutors
subject to reelection.54 Moreover, the Senator was in the same party as
the sitting President. The offending attorneys were veterans of cases
involving corruption of public officials, not the sort of prosecutors who
are normally subject to political considerations or who were
inexperienced or lacking in resources.56 Finally, the Jones case involved
possession of a single gun, not the sort of prosecution with political
implications particularly for a U.S. Attorney's Office. Additionally,
the government attorney involved was a veteran prosecutor who has
previously been involved in serious criminal cases. 58
Why then did these prosecutors, like so many others, engage in this
type of misconduct? I do not think that any prosecutor knowingly fails to
49. In response to a question put to Judge Wolf by this author during his conference
presentation, he acknowledged that, despite the above record, he found it difficult to find intentional
misconduct in this case but could not point to a specific reason for that.
50. Jones, 620 F. Supp. 2d at 165, 167.
51. Id. at 167. The U.S. Attorney for the District of Massachusetts has already determined that
she will not order her assistants to attend the court's criminal discovery training sessions. Sheri
Qualters, New U.S. Attorney in Boston Plans to Target FinancialFraud, ChildExploitation, NAT'L
L.J., Dec. 2, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJjsp?id=1202436008330.
52. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, supra note 21, at 298.
53. Id. at 262-63.
54. Palazzolo & Scarcella, supra note 27.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. United States v. Jones, 620 F. Supp. 2d 163, 164 (D. Mass. 2009).
58. Id. at 182-83.
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disclose exculpatory evidence in order to convict an innocent person.
But I would not be the first to suggest that the failure to disclose
exculpatory information results from an office culture that rewards
convictions and breeds an attitude that the prosecution is engaged in a
battle against the guilty, so the ends justify the means.5 9 Once the
prosecution has decided in its own mind that the defendant is guilty, the
goal becomes one of marshalling the evidence to ensure conviction and
avoiding or minimizing any other evidence that gets in the way.60 Since
the police have solved the case and the defendant is guilty, any evidence
to the contrary is not reliable, and therefore not "material," so the
rationalization goes. 61 Or the prosecutor who has already become
convinced of the defendant's guilt and who has little time to devote to
further investigation, ignores the importance of affirmatively looking for
exculpatory evidence in his own files, or those of the police, or fails to
recognize the significance of such evidence of which he is aware.6 2
There is no shortage of scholarly articles that have recommended
measures to curtail this form of prosecutorial misconduct, including
judicial supervision of discovery and disciplinary proceedings against
offending prosecutors.6 3 Others have suggested that these remedies have
already proved to be ineffective and new ideas need to be developed,
such as offering financial incentives to prosecutors for ethical practices
and full open-file discovery.6 4 At the Hofstra conference, several ideas
were promoted by presenters and in "break out" sessions including
internal audits and other quality control mechanisms to learn from past
misconduct and to deter such behavior in the future. One scholar has
even proposed setting up independent ethics commissions, separate from
59. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One's Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel
Vision, 49 How. L.J. 475, 484 (2006); Abby L. Dennis, Reining in the Minister of Justice:
ProsecutorialOversight and the Superseder Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 131, 138 (2007); Uphoff, supra
note 9, at 822-23.
60. See Uphoff, supra note 9, at 786 (noting how prosecutors sometimes exploit evidence to
induce guilty pleas).
61. Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in
Criminal Cases, 2006 Wis. L. REv. 291, 292, 330; Paul C. Giannelli, ProsecutorialEthics and the
Right to a Fair Trial: The Role of the Brady Rule in the Modern CriminalJustice System, 57 CASE
W. REs. L. REV. 593, 601 (2007); Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, ProsecutorialDiscretion
and Post-ConvictionEvidence ofInnocence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 467, 488 (2009).
62. See Findley & Scott, supra note 61, at 292.
63. See, e.g., Michael E. Gardner, An Affair to Remember: Further Refinement of the
Prosecutor'sDuty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 68 Mo. L. REv. 469, 480-81 (2003).
64. Stephanos Bibas, Rewarding Prosecutorsfor Performance,6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. LAW 441,
448 (2009); Peter A. Joy, Brady and Jailhouse Informants: Responding To Injustice, 57 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 619, 641-42; Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing
ProsecutorialDiscretion and Conduct With Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 873
(1995).
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existing disciplinary proceedings and presumably composed of defense
attorneys, to investigate and police prosecutorial misconduct.65
In my opinion, however, these measures are only reactions to the
culture which causes the problem and do not address the problem itself:
the practice of seeing the role of the prosecutor as seeking a conviction
rather than seeking truth. If the government attorneys in the three
examples above had been as interested in letting the fact finders consider
all the evidence and come to their own conclusions on guilt instead of
trying to impose their own opinions on the fact finders, they would have
saved themselves much aggravation and humiliation. The answer does
not lie in further attempts to investigate or deter prosecutorial
misconduct; it can only be found in the ethical education of lawyers
before they become prosecutors, in electing or appointing lead
prosecutors who will impose these values on the offices that they lead,
and in prosecutors using clear and unambiguous guidelines for
disclosure.66
Law schools must assume the obligation to not only teach students
the rules and skills they will need for the practice of law but also to
instill the values that will ensure that these students are promoting
justice.67 For future prosecutors, the most effective means to accomplish
this is for the law school to establish a prosecution externship course
with on-site and seminar components. 68 In such a program, the student is
placed in a prosecutor's office where he spends a specified amount of
time each week. He will assist the attorneys with their work and perhaps
handle some cases himself under the supervision of the prosecutors and
a faculty member. In this way, the student is exposed to the actual work
of a prosecutor and has an opportunity to experience the office culture as
well as the inherent pressure of the job. There is also a seminar
component run by the faculty member where the student reflects on his
work along with other students in similar positions. The curriculum
includes significant time devoted to the prosecutor's role, to ethical
issues that frequently arise for prosecutors, and to values that contribute

65. Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It Is Time to Take Prosecution Discipline
Seriously, 8 UDC/DCSL L. REv. 275, 297-98 (2004).
66. Stephanos Bibas, ProsecutorialRegulation Versus ProsecutorialAccountability, 157 U.
PA. L. REV. 959, 997, 1003 (2009).
67. Peter L. Davis, Why Not a Justice School? On the Role ofJustice in Legal Educationand
the Construction of a Pedagogy of Justice, 30 HAMLINE L. REV. 513, 525 (2007) ("Law schools
bear a major responsibility for the adverse changes that occur in students while they are under our
tutelage.").
68. Stacy Caplow, "Tacking Too Close to the Wind": The Challenge to Prosecution Clinics
to Set our Students on a Straight Course, 74 Miss. L.J. 919, 920-21 (2005); Peter A. Joy,
ProsecutionClinics: Dealing With ProfessionalRole, 74 Miss. L.J. 955, 967 (2005).
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to a just result. Specific cases should be discussed which resulted in
wrongful convictions, such as The Palladium 69 and Martin Tankleffo
aborted convictions. It is helpful if the faculty member has substantial
experience as a prosecutor not only to be familiar with the myriad issues
that confront law enforcement but also to serve as a role model for the
students as an ethical prosecutor.
Last semester in the prosecution externship that I supervise, one of
the students in the seminar presented a description of her work in the
complaint room of an urban district attorney's office, which included
interviewing witnesses and having them confirm their police statements.
She described that one witness in a domestic violence incident told her
that what was in her police statement was not true and that the defendant
did not intentionally strike her. I asked the student whether she
documented this different version and she said she had not. When I
asked why she failed to do this, another student working in another
prosecutor's office interjected: "Why would she want to create
ammunition for the other side?" Seizing on this "teaching moment," I
then lectured on the constitutional and ethical responsibilities of a
prosecutor, to which the students had apparently never been exposed. It
generated hours of discussion on Brady issues, 7 1 unethical behavior that
other students had observed at their placements, and why the prosecutor
should be concerned with the truth and not only convictions. If not for
this course, the students may never have absorbed these values. I also
showed a video documenting a wrongful conviction and had the students
read about a defendant who was freed after eighteen years in prison to
generate additional discussion and thoughts and to impress upon the
students that these things really do happen.72
Next, the responsibility for ensuring ethical behavior by the staff
falls on the main prosecutor, whether the elected District Attorney or the
appointed U.S. Attorney. The assistants take their lead from the top and
the top should lead by example. It is insufficient to have ethical
69. Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 61, at 467-70; Lemus Acquitted After 13 Years in
Prison, MSNBC.coM (Dec. 7, 2007, 05:32 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22152228/ns/
datelinenbc-crime-reports/.
70. See RICHARD FIRSTMAN & JAY SALPETER, A CRIMINAL INJUSTICE: A TRUE CRIME, A
FALSE CONFESSION, AND THE FIGHT TO FREE MARTY TANKLEFF 564-65 (2008) (describing the

court decision which overturned Martin Tankleff's conviction).
71. For instance, is exculpatory information likely to be disclosed if it is not written down?
See Robert P. Mosteller, The Special Threat of Informants to the Innocent Who Are Not Innocents:
Producing 'FirstDrafts,' Recording Incentives, and Taking a Fresh Look at the Evidence, 6 OHIO
ST. J. OF CRIM. L. 519, 564, 567 (2009). See generally United States v. Rodriguez, 496 F.3d 221 (2d
Cir. 2007) (holding that the U.S. Government is not required to make notes of a witness's
statements).
72. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
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instruction come only from an appellate attorney or one responsible for
training, which is usually the case in most prosecution offices. The
District Attorney should personally emphasize that ethics and fairness
are of equal importance to the work of the office as is securing the
conviction of the people prosecuted.74 She should stress that prosecutors
are not always right and that they should maintain an open mind while
leaving the determination of guilt to the fact finder." In my opinion, this
can best be accomplished by having the District Attorney personally
deliver an ethical lecture at regular intervals, discussing issues such as
plea bargaining, discovery, and witness preparation. Supervisors should
also be hired based on their embracing of and adherence to strict ethical
standards. The supervisors should periodically meet with the trial
assistants to go over their individual cases with particular focus on
ensuring that they are meeting their Brady and other ethical obligations.
The Office should investigate disclosure problems identified by defense
attorneys and judges, affirmatively sanction violations, and monitor
individual prosecutors who have a history of this behavior. Training
should also include exposure to the wrongful convictions that have
resulted from the suppression of exculpatory information. If the
prosecutor's office is structured to emphasize seeking the truth, if hiring
is guided by that principle, and if advancement requires adherence to it,
we might see the gradual retreat of the emphasis on convictions as the
primary measure of success. Of course, this requires that elected
prosecutors educate the public on the importance of fairness and make it
part of their campaign. 6
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, prosecution offices must
abandon reliance on the crutch of "materiality" to determine what should
be disclosed to the defense in the first instance. While I have no
objection to the use of materiality as a standard for appellate review in
deciding whether a Brady violation should result in vacating a
conviction, it is a poorly designed measure to use in deciding whether
73. See Bibas, supra note 64, at 997-98.
74. See id. at 998-1000.
75. See id. at 999-1000. As Attorney General, Eric Holder recently told new government
lawyers at a swearing in ceremony: "Your job as assistant U.S. attorneys is not to convict
people.... Your job is not to win cases. Your job is to do justice. Your job is in every case, every
decision that you make, to do the right thing. Anybody who asks you to do something other than
that is to be ignored. And I mean that." Nedra Pickier, US. Attorneys Told to Expect Scrutiny:
Senator's Case Leaves Taint, Holder Says, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 9, 2009, http://www.boston.com/
news/nation/articles/2009/04/09/us.attomeysjtold-to-expectscrutiny/.
76. Recently, candidates for District Attorney have won elections by stressing to the public
the need for innovative programs. See Bibas, supra note 66, at 986 & n. 102; Jennifer Emily & Steve
McGonigle, Battlefor Justice Turns for Ethics: ProsecutorsHidingEvidence Need to be Punished,
Watkins Says, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 4, 2008, at lA.
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information should be disclosed to a defendant before trial. First, the
definition of materiality is too vague and confusing to be left to the
discretion of individual prosecutors. Is information "material" when: (a)
it is "probable" that disclosure would have resulted in a different
outcome;77 (b) it is "possible" that disclosure would have created a
different result;78 or (c) considering the suppressed evidence would
"undermine confidence in the verdict?" 7 9 Second, if the trial assistant
has already personally determined from the evidence that the defendant
is guilty, how can she produce an objective determination that the
information in question might lead to a different result? As one scholar
(and former prosecutor) has thoughtfully proposed, psychological factors
such as confirmatory bias, selective information processing, and
resistance to cognitive dissonance inherently lead to Brady violations
even by the most ethical of prosecutors.80 Prospectively making a
determination of "materiality" based on a retrospective analysis of the
evidence is hardly the way to make an accurate decision.81 Lastly, even
an experienced and ethical prosecutor is not equipped with the
knowledge and perspective that the defendant's attorney has to
determine what information is helpful to the client and how to make the
best use of it given the defense that will be asserted.82 It should be left to
the defense attorney to make that evaluation, not the prosecutor.
These considerations and others have resulted in attempts to
eliminate or water down the "materiality" issue from the decision about
whether to disclose exculpatory evidence. In New York, Rule 3.8(b) of
the Rules of Professional Discipline, adopted in April 2009, does not
require that exculpatory evidence be "material" before its suppression
77. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
78. People v. Vilardi, 555 N.E.2d 915, 920 (N.Y. 1990).
79. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995).
80. See Alafair S. Burke, Brady's Brainteaser: The Accidental Prosecutor and Cognitive
Bias, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 575, 579-80 (2007); Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial
Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1593-1602
(2006) [hereinafter Burke, Improving ProsecutorialDecision Making]; Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting
ProsecutorialDisclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 494-96 (2009).
81. See Burke, Improving ProsecutorialDecisionMaking, supra note 80, at 1610.
82. See Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668-69 (1957) (stating that only defense
attorneys are properly equipped to determine the usefulness of witness statements).
83. This is comparable to the reason witness statements are disclosed to the defense: "Because
only the defense is adequately equipped to determine the effective use for purpose of discrediting
the Government's witness and thereby furthering the accused's defense, the defense must initially
be entitled to see them to determine what use may be made of them." Id. "[O]missions, contrasts
and even contradictions, vital perhaps, for discrediting a witness, are certainly not as apparent to the
impartial presiding judge as to single-minded counsel for the accused; the latter is in a far better
position to appraise the value of a witness' pretrial statements, for impeachment purposes." People
v. Rosario, 173 N.E.2d 881, 883 (N.Y. 1961).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol38/iss3/4

14

Klein: A View from inside the Ropes: A Prosecutor's Viewpoint on Disclos

2010]

DISCLOSING EXCULPA TORY EVIDENCE

88 1

will subject a prosecutor to disciplinary sanctions.84 Moreover, the
National District Attorneys Association has likewise eliminated
"materiality" from its recommended National Prosecution Standards on
disclosure.85 The New York City Legal Aid Society has also left out a
"materiality" requirement from its recommended overhaul of the New
York State law of discovery. 86 The New York Court of Appeals has
reduced the evidentiary showing for a Brady violation to a "possibility"
of a different result if the evidence had been disclosed where the defense
has made a specific request for it87 and has recently held that reversal
will be required even where "this is a close question."88
After the Ted Stevens prosecution collapsed, the Department of
Justice was directed by the Attorney General to review the government's
discovery practices and to formulate rules that would prevent this from
89
recurring. Ironically, in the resulting Memorandum for Department
Prosecutors entitled "Guidance for Prosecutors Regarding Criminal
Discovery," dated January 4, 2010, there is virtually no change in the
requirement of "materiality" to disclose exculpatory information.90
Despite some basic instructions as to the process to engage in to
determine if disclosure should occur and a broad "encouragement" to
provide more disclosure than is required, this Memorandum merely
refers to the previous policy contained in the U.S. Attorney Manual. 9'
That document in turn, although suggesting that prosecutors take "a
broad view of materiality" and claiming to require disclosure by a
84. Contrary to Brady, however, Rule 3.8(b) does require that a prosecutor is actually aware
of the favorable information before sanctions may be imposed. N.Y. R. PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(b)
(2009), available at http://www.nysba.org/Content/NavigationMenu/ForAttomeys/Professional
StandardsforAttomeys/FinalNYRPCswithComments(AprilI 2009).pdf.
85. NAT'L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS'N, NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS 53.5 (2d ed. 1991).
86. LEGAL AID SoC'Y, CRIMINAL DISCOVERY REFORM IN NEW YORK: PROPOSAL TO REPEAL
C.P.I. ARTICLE 240 AND TO ENACT A NEW C.P.I. ARTICLE 245, at 14-16 (2009), http://www.legal-

aid.org/en/mediaandpublicinformation/inthenews/thelegalaidsocietyproposescriminaldiscoveryrefor
m.aspx (follow "Download the Proposal for Discovery Reform" hyperlink) (listing proposed Article
245.20 for automatic discovery).
87. People v. Vilardi, 555 N.E.2d 915, 920 (N.Y. 1990).
88. People v. Hunter, 892 N.E.2d 365, 368 (N.Y. 2008). See also Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct.
1769, 1786 (2009), where the Supreme Court reiterated the "reasonable probability" standard but
remanded the case to determine if it was "possible" that the suppressed information may have
persuaded the jury to give more consideration to defendant's drug use in mitigation of the sentence.
89. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attomey General Announces Increased Training,
Review of Process for Providing Materials to Defense in Criminal Cases (Apr. 14, 2009),
http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/2009/April/09-opa-338.html.
90. Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att'y Gen., to Dep't Prosecutors (Jan. 4,
2010), http://www.justice.gov/dag/discovery-guidance.html.
91. Id. ("[P]rosecutors should be aware that Section 9-5.001 details the Department's policy
regarding the disclosure of exculpatory and impeachment information and provides for broader
disclosures than required by Brady and Giglio.").
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standard that is broader than "'material' to guilt," still retains
discretionary standards on the part of the individual prosecutor that
control the disclosure decision. 92 For example, only impeachment
material which "casts a substantial doubt upon the accuracy of any
evidence" or "might have a significant bearing on the admissibility of
prosecution evidence" need be disclosed. 9 3 Moreover, disclosure is not
authorized where, in the opinion of the individual prosecutor, it is
"irrelevant or not significantly probative" and involves "spurious issues
or arguments which serve to divert the trial process from examining the
genuine issues." 94
In the name of correcting the abuses which caused the failure of the
Stevens prosecution, the Department of Justice has just replaced one
ambiguous standard ("materiality") with several others ("substantial
doubt," "significant bearing," "significantly probative," and "spurious")
and left it to the discretion of individual lawyers to apply them.9'
Despite the lofty words of the Attorney General,9 6 without more
guidance and clarity than this, the federal government should not expect
much improvement in its attorneys' disclosure performance.
I am not naive to think that external controls will no longer be
needed if the above suggestions are implemented. Just as in any
profession, organization, or environment, there will always be those
who, for their own reasons, fail to comply with the rules. Internal
prosecution sanctions, court supervision, and disciplinary proceedings,
along with appellate reversal of convictions when appropriate, will still
be needed to deter and punish the outliers. However, the increased focus
on education, leadership, and unambiguous standards, along with the
existing regulatory devices, should help to reduce the problems
associated with disclosure of exculpatory information and allow
prosecutors to pursue their mission with their fairways being wide and
the wind always at their backs.
92. U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL §§ 9-5.001(B)(1), (C), (E),
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading.room/usam/title9/5mcrm.htm (last updated June
2010).
93. Id. §9-5.001(C)(2).
94. Id. § 9-5.001(C).
95. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 75. Moreover, despite a request from the federal judge in the Ted Stevens
prosecution that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and local rules in the District of Columbia
be amended to eliminate the materiality standard for disclosing exculpatory information, the
Department of Justice has opposed any such change. See Mike Scarcella, DOJ Outlines Changes
After Backlash Over Handling of Stevens Case, LAW.COM, Oct. 19, 2009, http://truthinjustice.org/
DOJ-discovery.htm; Mike Scarcella, FederalJudge in Washington Pushesfor Local Rule Changes,
THE BLT (Dec. 7, 2009, 03:04 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2009/12/federal-judge-inwashington-pushes-for-local-rule-change.html.
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